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NOTES AND COMMENT

The words of the court are sufficient to detail the situation which
came into existence on the footsteps of this decision. Considering the
number of foreign motorists who visit the state during the summer
months, the complications that might result would be many Unscrupulous traffic officers could lead innocent drivers into senous 'situations and subject them to unjust court actions without incurring more
than a moral obligation. The court is tobe commended for calling attention to the gravity of the question.
The suggestion to the Legislature was well received for on May 22.
1925, section 85.oi, subd. 3 was amended to read as follows
Every such operator or driver shall keep to the right of the center of highway

intersections when turning to the right and shall pass to the right of such center

when turning to the left, EXCEPT WHERE MARKERS OR SIGNS SHALL
HAVE BEEN PLACED BY THE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES HAVING
JURISDICTION OF THE HIGHWAY OR STREET, INDICATING OR
DIRECTING THAT PUBLIC TRAVEL SHALL FOLLOW A DIFFERENT
COURSE.

This amendment adjusts the former apparently unfair condition and
foreign, as well as local, drivers of automobiles can follow the orders
and directions of traffic officers without fear of violating the law In
a state like Wisconsin, which is visited yearly by thousands of tourists,
the law as it now stands is as it should be, and the Legislature is to be
congratulated for having acted so promptly after the suggestion given
by our Supreme Court.
H.U.A.
Wills

Condition in a will, requiring a forfeiture of substantial

sum in case of contesting, is against public policy, where there
exists probable cause and good faith.-In a recent Wisconsin case.
In Re Keenan's Will,' the will contained a provision that if any legatee
opposed the probate of the will, that person's legacy should be forfeited. The legatee contested on the ground of lack of testementary
capacity of the testatrix, and the lower court, ignoring the advisory
verdict of the jury which found that at the time of the execution of the
vill the testatrix did lack testamentary capacity, admitted the will to
probate. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court.2 Subsequently,
the executor petitioned the county court for a construction of the will
to determine whether or not the contestant had forfeited his legacy, and
the court, adhering to the terms of the will found that he had. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed this ruling, and held that, because
our constitution provides for every person's right to the remedies of
the law, and the right to obtain justice freely and without being obliged
to purchase it, completely and without denial 3 -to allow a condition of
this kind would be contrary to public policy in the view of such constitutional provision and the statutes which make it the duty, under
heavy penalty, of the county judges, executors, and all other persons
who have possession of wills to present them for probate. 4 After
205 N.W iooi (Nov. 1925).
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enumerating the statutory steps required for the (probate of a will, the
court said, "They evince a clear recognition and declaration of the
legislature that there is public policy involved in the establishment of
every legally executed will." Since the subject of wills and the succession of property is of interest to even the layman, it may be of value
to compare Wisconsin's position with that of other jurisdictions.
In Cooke v Turner (1846)1 the will incorporated a forfeiture clause
substantially similiar to the instant case. The court held the clause
valid because the state is not interested in whether the heir or devisee
takes the property, leaving the parties alone to make their own contracts.
The case was approved in Eventural v. Eventural,6 and in Donegan
v. Wade' a provision in a will declaring a forfeiture in the event of a
contest was held binding, as was also held in Bradford v. Bradford,"
which was decided largely on Cooke v. Turner The Supreme Court
of California has affirmed Cooke v Turner in In Re Kite,9 and In Re
Miller'0 sustained a will with a forfeiture clause where their existed
probable cause.
From most of the cases cited it was impossible to determine whether
or not there was probable cause, but in the following cases, as in the
case under comment, there was probable cause. Morris v Borroughs"
held the provision "in terrorem" only and no forfeiture, and Jackson v.
Westerfield" also held no forfeiture where there existed probable cause.
The New York case, In. Re Kathan's Will," sustained the same ruling,
and the authorities are reviewed at considerable length. The rule of the
instant case is also approved6 in Whitehurst v. Gotwalt," Rouse v
Brunch" and In Re Friend.
Werner, in his authentic work The American Law of Adnvmnistration" quotes In Re Friend (supra) to the effect that if there is probabiles
causa litigandi the forfeiture cannot be enforced. In his work on wills,
Shouler says
To exclude all contests of the probate on reasonable ground that the testator
was insane or unduly influenced when he made the will, is to intrench fraud and
coercion more securely, and public policy should not concede that a legatee, no
matter what ground of litigation existed, must forfieit his legacy if the will is
finally admitted. 8

Chancellor Wardlow of South Carolina in Mullet v Smith 9 says,
"A condition subsequent of this description is void whether there is a
r15 Meeson and Welsby's Reports.
'6 Privy Council Appeals 1 (1873).
'7o Ala. 50, (1881).
9igOhio St. 546 (1866).
u155 Cal. 436 (igog), loi Pac. 443.
156 Cal. 119 (1909), 103 Pac. 842.
"i Atkyns 404 (739).
8861 How Prac. (N.Y.) 400 (88).
S141 N.Y.S. 705.
"1 27
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devise over or not, as touching on the 'liberty of the law.'" A note in
40 Cyc 17o5 remarks that some jurisdictions recognize that probable
cause bars forfeiture. In a note in 68 L. R. A. 452 the above exception is reiterated.
Whether we recognize Cooke v. Turner as the general rule or not,
there are a number of jurisdictions which recognize It Re Friend
(supra), and if we say Cooke v. Turner is the general rule, then the
answer must be that In Re Friend and the cases following it are exceptions. In view of the fact that it is desirable for the courts to have all
the facts before them, and since courts are instruments of justice, it
would be against public policy for the courts to sanction one person's
preventing another from having his day in court, when that other's
litigation is based upon probable cause.
WILKE ZIMMERS

